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Bank Culture and the Official Sector:  
A Spectrum of Options 
Michael Held and Thomas M. Noone 
Culture is a topic of growing interest in financial services. The 
purpose of this Article is to explain why we—two lawyers at a central 
bank—have paid attention. We also hope to prompt conversations with 
academics, regulators, and bankers about how culture contributes to 
decisions and behaviors in the financial services industry. 
Culture, ethics, and behavior tend to be the professional pursuits of 
anthropologists, philosophers, and psychologists—not lawyers or central 
bankers. But, we are convinced that culture is a topic worthy of attention, 
dialogue, and action in any profession, industry, or organization, including 
financial services. Culture in financial services is especially important 
because the decisions that bankers and other financial professionals make 
affect others (all of us, really) in powerful ways. 
It may sound obvious, or overly modest, to say that “culture matters.” 
Five years ago, the prevailing reaction to a suggestion that regulators and 
supervisors1 should pay attention to culture was, in essence, “seriously?” 
This idea can still provoke skepticism. The word itself—culture—can 
prompt visceral aversion or quick dismissal as a “somewhat contested 
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 1. The United States regulates many industries, but subjects banks and certain other financial 
institutions to supervision as well. At the Federal Reserve, 
[r]egulation entails establishing the rules within which financial institutions must operate—
in other words, issuing specific regulations and guidelines governing the formation, 
operations, activities, and acquisitions of financial institutions. Once the rules and 
regulations are established, supervision—which involves monitoring, inspecting, and 
examining financial institutions—seeks to ensure that an institution complies with those 
rules and regulations, and that it operates in a safe and sound manner. 
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM PURPOSES & 
FUNCTIONS 74 (10th ed. 2016).  
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academic concept,” mired in theoretical or semantic disagreement,2 not 
easily quantifiable and measurable as compared to, say, capital or 
liquidity. It is too subjective or “squishy” to merit serious discussion. 
If you think culture is too squishy, please hear us out. In Part I of this 
Article, we set out what we mean by culture. In Part II, we explain why 
we are interested in culture and why it matters to us now. In Part III, we 
will survey the work of other public authorities in their efforts to address 
culture. In our view, these efforts fall into several categories along a 
spectrum from more advisory to more prescriptive. We do not endorse any 
particular method. All of these efforts are useful attempts to address a 
common problem: repeated ethical failures that undermine the 
trustworthiness of financial services. We hope this Part will direct 
interested academics to useful source material and demonstrate the value 
of the various different approaches. In Part IV, we will focus on what the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (the New York Fed) has done to 
address culture. These efforts fall on the advisory end of the spectrum of 
available tools covered in Part III. This reflects, in part, the New York 
Fed’s role within the Federal Reserve, the central bank of the United 
States. Finally, in Part V, we pose a few questions for further discussion 
in academic forums: 
1. What are we missing about culture? 
2. What else should we and our colleagues at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York do? 
3. How do we know if there has been progress? 
This Article does not include the customary survey of scholarly 
literature; we leave that to the more academically focused. Our purpose is 
not to fill gaps in what theorists and researchers have written. In addition, 
we avoid stating how financial institutions have approached culture, 
except where their efforts are public or described by other public 
authorities. This approach avoids concerns about inadvertently disclosing 
any confidential supervisory information. 
I. 
As we use the term, culture means the shared norms within a group 
that are evidenced through behavior. There are four key concepts 
embedded in this definition: (1) shared, (2) norms, (3) evidence, and (4) 
behavior. 
                                                     
 2. See generally Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y. 
Conference: Reforming Culture and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry: Good Compliance, 
Not Mere Compliance (Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo 
20141020a.htm [https://perma.cc/3EYX-4GQX]. 
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First, culture must be shared. Culture concerns groups, not 
individuals. Of course, we are all part of multiple groups within and apart 
from where we work. This makes assessing and managing culture 
difficult—that is the bad news. The good news, however, is that culture is 
ordinary. Every group has a culture. We all know this from the many 
groups of which we are a part—culture helps us fit in and get along. In our 
view, groups that pay attention to their cultures will be more effective—
more successful in fulfilling their purposes—than groups that ignore their 
cultures and tempt fate. 
Second, norms are customs or habits followed by a group. Norms are 
part of the human psyche. Each of us relies on group norms for mental 
efficiency because we cannot possibly reason through every choice. We 
look around us. We see what succeeds and what does not. And, hopefully, 
we model our decisions and conduct on the former, not the latter. If a 
person’s behavior violates a group norm, the group may impose some 
informal discipline. Group norms are also gap-fillers and interpreters; they 
pick up where rules leave off. After all, rules cannot address every scenario 
and often require interpretive gloss. Group norms often supply that gloss. 
Third, there must be evidence. We are suspicious of assessments or 
diagnoses of culture based on intuition. Intuition is often judgment based 
on incomplete and inadequate facts, unverified anecdotes, and secondhand 
rumors. Once we gather evidence, we can begin to think about 
commonalities, root causes, and their relationship to culture. Of course, 
interpretations of facts may vary, but a commitment to observable 
behavior supplies objectivity. 
Finally, there is behavior. In our view, this is the best evidence of 
culture. Behavior is a transmission mechanism for norms, or “how we do 
things.” In looking at a group’s culture, we cannot just consider statements 
of values—what some call “tone from the top.” Clear, simple principles 
and statements of purpose have their uses. To understand culture, however, 
we must observe what is done as well as what is said or written. Therefore, 
in assessing a group’s culture, stated criteria for hiring, conduct, and 
promotion matter less than actual choices about who is hired, who is fired, 
and who is rewarded. It is critical to recognize that a group’s narrative may 
differ radically from how members of the group actually behave. 
An effective culture is one that enables an organization to fulfill its 
purposes. Speaking at the New York Fed in 2016, the philosopher Onora 
O’Neill urged the audience to consider the question: “What is banking 
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for?”3 And, more specifically addressed to bankers in the audience: “What 
is your bank for?”4 
These questions require continuous attention. Some features of what 
it means to be a bank are enduring, but others change. Last year, the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency announced it would issue national bank 
charters for non-depository “fintech” companies.5 More recently, the 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority announced it granted banking licenses to 
four companies that will operate “virtual banks.”6 Many well-established 
financial institutions, meanwhile, promote themselves as “technology 
companies.”7 If technology companies want to be banks, and banks want 
to be technology companies, What does this tell us about the purpose of 
banking? 
Of course, many financial services firms comprise businesses 
beyond banks, strictly speaking. That may make Baroness O’Neill’s 
questions more difficult to answer, and perhaps more important. Whether 
a bank is large or small, complex or simple, these questions require careful 
thought. We will not attempt to answer them here. It is essential, moreover, 
that banks answer these questions for themselves. Supervisors should not 
supply the answers. 
That said, supervisors can give suggestions. Over the years, the 
Federal Reserve’s supervisory materials have pointed to a consistent set of 
features that characterize an effective bank culture. These include 
consumer protection, compliance with laws and regulations, and the 
avoidance of conflicts of interest.8 A good culture promotes conduct that 
an objective observer would consider ethical.9 It will also promote 
                                                     
 3. Onora O’Neill, Baroness of Bengarve, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s 
Conference: Reforming Culture and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry: What is Banking 
For? 1 (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/governance-and-culture-
reform/ONeill-Culture-Workshop-Remarks-10202016.pdf [https://perma.cc/944D-MTCN].  
 4. Id.  
 5. News Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Begins Accepting National 
Bank Charter Applications from Financial Technology Companies (July 31, 2018), https://www. 
occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2018/nr-occ-2018-74.html [https://perma.cc/GW5R-24DT]. 
 6. Press Release, H.K. Monetary Auth., Granting of Virtual Banking Licences (May 9, 2019), 
https://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/key-information/press-releases/2019/20190509-3.shtml [https://perma 
.cc/QVG5-RDUE]. 
 7. See Matt Levine, It’s Getting Harder to Tell Banks from Tech Companies, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 
14, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-02-15/lloyd-blankfein-wants-goldman-
sachs-to-push-technology [https://perma.cc/Y7DS-BYQZ]; see also JPMORGAN CHASE, INVESTING 
IN OUR FUTURE 52 (2015), https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/investor-relations/document 
/ar2015-lettertoshareholders.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MZW-QLKQ]. 
 8. Letter from Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys., to the Officer in Charge of Supervision at 
Each Reserve Bank and to Domestic and Foreign Large Fin. Insts. 5 (Dec. 17, 2012), https://www. 
federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1217.pdf [https://perma.cc/UKC7-5ZJ8]. 
 9. Letter from Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys., to Officer in Charge of Supervision and 
Appropriate Supervisory and Examination Staff at Each Fed. Reserve Bank and Certain Orgs. 
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objective thinking, questioning, and challenging of ideas.10 Further, where 
appropriate, it will encourage escalation—raising one’s hand, so to 
speak—so that problems receive appropriate attention and stay small.11 
Many supervisors discuss culture with a limiting adjective: 
compliance culture or risk culture, for example. We tend to avoid those 
terms. For one thing, they may encourage thinking about culture from a 
perspective that is too narrow—for example, a perspective of controls. We 
like controls as much as any supervisor. But culture, as we use the term, 
consists of more than limits on discretion, the detection of mistakes, and 
concepts like fallbacks, backstops, and redundancy. We believe a good 
culture requires conscious choice, not merely reliable processes.12 We 
want firms and bankers to make better decisions—that is, decisions that 
align with the public and private purposes of a bank in the near term and 
over the long term. 
II. 
A. So Why Culture? And Why Now? 
Bill Dudley, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s former 
president, has spent four decades in financial services—at the Federal 
Reserve and in the private sector. As he explained in late 2013, “[t]here is 
evidence of deep-seated cultural and ethical failures at many large 
financial institutions. Whether this is due to size and complexity, bad 
incentives, or some other issues is difficult to judge, but it is another 
critical problem that needs to be addressed.”13 
“Deep-seated cultural and ethical failures” is strong talk from a 
central banker. The evidence supports this assessment. In the years 
following the financial crisis, regulators and supervisors at the Federal 
Reserve tried to focus their resources on improving stability of the 
financial system and the “safety and soundness” of firms. These tasks—
challenging at any time—were made more difficult by a litany of headline-
grabbing scandals. Some of the misconduct in these scandals was illegal—
a crime or regulatory violation. Other misconduct was arguably legal but 
                                                     
Supervised by the Fed. Reserve (Oct. 16, 2008), https://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
boarddocs/srletters/2008/SR0808.htm [https://perma.cc/ATE4-C68U]. 
 10. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RESERVE SYS., BANK HOLDING COMPANY SUPERVISION 
MANUAL § 2126.0.5 (2019). 
 11. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RESERVE SYS., TRADING AND CAPITAL MARKETS ACTIVITIES 
MANUAL § 2150.1 (2011). 
 12. See generally CAPITAL FAILURE: REBUILDING TRUST IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 15–16 
(Nicholas Morris & David Vines eds., 2014). 
 13. William C. Dudley, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks 
at the Global Economic Policy Forum: Ending Too Big to Fail (Nov. 7, 2013), https://www.newyork 
fed.org/newsevents/speeches/2013/dud131107.html [https://perma.cc/LP76-JYYA]. 
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nonetheless unethical or reckless. Some misconduct pre-dated the 
financial crisis. Some coincided with it. And some occurred after 2009. 
Many of our colleagues have particular examples that caused them 
to say, “Enough, already!” For Dudley, it was the manipulation of the 
London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR)—arguably the most important 
benchmark in finance—and of foreign exchange (FX) rates.14 At their 
core, these scandals involved the collaboration by traders at multiple firms 
to achieve benchmark or exchange rates that did not reflect actual market 
conditions. For LIBOR, multiple firms admitted to fraud in the submission 
of rates to the trade association that published LIBOR. The conduct by 
traders at Deutsche Bank, one of several banks that pleaded guilty to 
LIBOR-related violations, is indicative of similar conduct across the 
industry: 
[F]rom at least 2003 through early 2011, numerous Deutsche Bank 
derivatives traders—whose compensation was directly connected to 
their success in trading financial products tied to LIBOR—engaged 
in efforts to move these benchmark rates in a direction favorable to 
their trading positions. Specifically, the derivatives traders requested 
that LIBOR submitters at Deutsche Bank and other banks submit 
contributions favorable to trading positions, rather than rates that 
complied with the definition of LIBOR. Through these schemes, 
Deutsche Bank defrauded counterparties who were unaware of the 
manipulation.15 
In the FX context, several firms pleaded guilty to conspiring to rig 
the foreign exchange market in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.16 
As the Department of Justice explained, 
Members of “The Cartel” manipulated the euro-dollar exchange rate 
by agreeing to withhold bids or offers for euros or dollars to avoid 
moving the exchange rate in a direction adverse to open positions 
held by co-conspirators. By agreeing not to buy or sell at certain 
times, the traders protected each other’s trading positions by 
                                                     
 14. See DAVID HOU & DAVID SKEIE, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 667, 
LIBOR: ORIGINS, ECONOMICS, CRISIS, SCANDAL, AND REFORM (2014); see also Press Release, Bd. 
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve Announces Fines Totaling More Than $1.8 
Billion Against Six Major Banking Organizations for Their Unsafe and Unsound Practices in Foreign 
Exchange (FX) Markets (May 20, 2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases 
/enforcement20150520a.htm [https://perma.cc/72J7-G4R2]. 
 15. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Deutsche Bank’s London Subsidiary Agrees to Plead 
Guilty in Connection with Long-Running Manipulation of LIBOR (Apr. 23, 2015), https://www. 
justice.gov/opa/pr/deutsche-banks-london-subsidiary-agrees-plead-guilty-connection-long-running-
manipulation [https://perma.cc/XHF3-GP6N]. 
 16. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018). 
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withholding supply of or demand for currency and suppressing 
competition in the FX market.17 
The firms that pleaded guilty also paid billions of dollars in fines as 
a result of this conduct. A number of traders were indicted for LIBOR and 
FX manipulation, and many (although not all) were convicted. Three 
features of these scandals stood out. 
First, the misconduct was not limited to one particular firm. The 
essence of these scandals was collusion across multiple firms. The 
manipulation schemes depended on contacts among traders at multiple 
banks in order to be successful. To some extent, the misconduct reflected 
the labor market. Some traders changed jobs frequently. A professional 
network at multiple firms made it easier to find another job. The traders 
involved in these scandals may have perceived loyalty to peers as more 
important than loyalty to employers. The norms that existed among this 
group of traders—that made it acceptable to help each other regardless of 
obligations to firms or clients—signaled a cultural problem, not just a 
control or compliance failure. 
Second, the misconduct undermined the trustworthiness of products 
on which the real economy relied. The investigations, however, produced 
no evidence that the traders involved considered the consequences of their 
decisions on others—at least, none so far as we are aware. LIBOR and 
foreign exchange rates were just numbers. Trading was just a game. But, 
as colleagues at the New York Fed have explained, “[t]he impact of 
employee misconduct extends beyond the individual and can [affect] the 
firm as a whole and the economy and financial markets more broadly.”18 
Third, these two scandals occurred sequentially. The bankers 
involved in FX manipulation knew that their firms were under 
investigation for LIBOR manipulation and that the investigations had 
found evidence of collusion in recorded chat rooms. They continued to use 
chatrooms anyway to exchange favors. 
The financial crisis and subsequent scandals like LIBOR and FX 
manipulation prompted others to ask similar questions. In 2014, under the 
leadership of Sir David Walker, Barclays published a report by Anthony 
Salz on the root causes of misconduct at that bank.19 Called the Salz 
Review, the report assessed root causes of an observed “gap between 
Barclays’ articulated values and the way the bank operated in practice,” 
                                                     
 17. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Five Major Banks Agree to Parent-Level Guilty Pleas 
(May 20, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/five-major-banks-agree-parent-level-guilty-pleas 
[https://perma.cc/U948-B38H]. 
 18. STEPHANIE CHALY ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., MISCONDUCT RISK, CULTURE, 
AND SUPERVISION 3 (2017).  
 19. See BARCLAYS, BUILDING THE ‘GO-TO’ BANK 126–29 (2014).  
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and recommended reforms.20 The report concluded, among other things, 
that “the business practices for which Barclays has rightly been criticized 
were shaped predominantly by its cultures, which rested on uncertain 
foundations.”21 Around the same time, the United Kingdom’s 
Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards looked across the 
industry, and summed up its views: 
[T]he weakness in standards and culture that has contributed to the 
loss of public trust in banks has not been confined to isolated parts of 
a few sub-standard banks. It has been more pervasive. Trust in 
banking can only be restored when it has been earned, and it will only 
have been earned when the deficiencies in banking standards and 
culture, and the underlying causes of those deficiencies, have been 
addressed.22 
Other central banks were early contributors to the discussion. Mark 
Carney, Governor of the Bank of Canada and, later, the Bank of England, 
was an early thought leader. He exhorted banks to safeguard their “social 
license”23 and encouraged them to consider basic questions about their 
purpose. “Who does finance serve? Itself? The real economy? Society? 
And to whom is the financier responsible? Herself? His business? Their 
system? The answers start from recognising that financial capitalism is not 
an end in itself, but a means to promote investment, innovation, growth, 
and prosperity.”24 
Talk of banks serving society, or of having both public purposes and 
private purposes, made some observers uncomfortable. In our view, 
financial institutions—and banks in particular—are not like other 
corporations. Banks play a structural role in the economy. That position 
allows them to affect others, which, by necessity, requires them to make 
decisions in the interest of the system. In recognition of that role, banks 
                                                     
 20. ANTHONY SALZ, SALZ REVIEW: AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF BARCLAYS’ BUSINESS 
PRACTICES 2 (2013).  
 21. Id. 
 22. 1 HOUSE OF LORDS & HOUSE OF COMMONS, PARLIAMENTARY COMM’N ON BANKING 
STANDARDS, CHANGING BANKING FOR GOOD 15 (2013).  
 23. Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of Eng., Speech at the Monetary Authority of Singapore: The 
Future of Financial Reform 12 (Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe 
/files/speech/2014/the-future-of-financial-reform.pdf?la=en&hash=670D969367D2A4BA5D5881F1 
DF4F3172836F8706 [https://perma.cc/9UNF-87U4] (“[T]rust between the public and the financial 
system is needed to maintain the social license for finance to operate. . . . Without that license, the 
door will be opened to a level of regulation that constrains the ability of finance to innovate and support 
growth and trade efficiently.”). 
 24. Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of Eng., Speech at the Conference on Inclusive Capitalism: 
Inclusive Capitalism: Creating a Sense of the Systemic 8 (May 27, 2014), https://www.bankof 
england.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/speech/2014/inclusive-capitalism-creating-a-sense-of-the-systemic 
.pdf?la=en&hash=B727934359BD632AACCD4B65ACC36B9D7CD91966 [https://perma.cc/MSF5 
-W9J9]. 
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receive tremendous operating benefits that are not available to other 
industries—access to the discount window, for example.25 The receipt of 
these benefits is what the public thinks of as a critical stakeholder (and, in 
a distressed firm, as a shareholder or significant creditor), to whom banks 
are accountable. After all, if banks do not somehow act for the benefit of 
the public, why should they receive the benefits from the public? Finally, 
banks hold themselves out as trustworthy custodians, and people trust 
them with their resources for a better future. The costs of dishonesty are 
too high for people who entrust their savings to banks and who depend in 
so many ways on a properly functioning financial system.26 
B. Limits of Statutes and Regulation 
The attempted manipulation of LIBOR and FX were not the only 
scandals to make headlines following the financial crisis. Often, problems 
at one firm appeared at other firms. In our experience, many of these 
scandals shared a common root cause: the technical aspects of rules can 
obscure their social purposes. As lawyers, this pattern jumped out at us. 
But before we saw these scandals as failures of culture, we saw them as 
exposing the limits of what statutes and regulations can achieve. 
For example, BNP Paribas and Credit Suisse faced criminal 
indictments for facilitating the evasion of U.S. sanctions and taxation, 
respectively.27 In both cases, legal requirements were seen as 
technicalities—as games companies can outsmart. The moral salience of 
the sanctions against Sudan, or of paying one’s taxes to the society in 
which one earns a living, was not relevant. Instead, the organizational goal 
of client service—in processing payments or facilitating flight capital—
clashed with and superseded public policy.28 
                                                     
 25. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 
PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 42–44 (10th ed. 2016).  
 26. See Michael Strine, First Vice President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at the 
Symposium Celebrating the 50th Anniversary of the Frank G. Zarb School of Business at Hofstra 
University and Looking Ahead to the Next 50 Years of Business Education: Forming the Next 
Generation of Bankers: The Future of Business Education and Ethics (Mar. 22, 2016), https://www. 
newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2016/str160322 [https://perma.cc/ER82-XYWK]. 
 27. See Order to Cease and Desist and Order of Assessment of a Civil Money Penalty Issued 
Upon Consent Pursuant to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as Amended, In the Matter of BNP 
Paribas S.A., Docket No. 14-022-B-FB (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. & Autorite de 
Controle Prudentiel et de Resolution June 30, 2014); Order to Cease and Desist and Order of 
Assessment of Civil Money Penalty Issued Upon Consent Pursuant to the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Act, as Amended, In the Matter of Credit Suisse AG, Docket No. 14-009-B-FB (Bd. of Governors of 
the Fed. Reserve Sys. May 19, 2014). 
 28. See Thomas C. Baxter, Exec. Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 
Remarks at the New Compliance Landscape: Increasing Roles – Increasing Risks Conference: 
Reflections on the New Compliance Landscape (July 23, 2014), https://www.newyorkfed.org 
/newsevents/speeches/2014/bax072314 [https://perma.cc/UY98-6UWD]. 
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A lack of “other-regarding” conduct29 was also evident in an example 
of civil enforcement by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) against JPMorgan Ventures Energy Corporation, a direct 
subsidiary of JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPMorgan).30 A division of 
JPMorgan owned output contracts from several older power plants in 
California. These plants, which burned fossil fuels to produce power, were 
profit-generating in periods of high energy consumption.31 However, they 
were overall money-losers because their cost of energy was much higher 
than solar- or wind-based power production. JPMorgan’s traders 
discovered a loophole in bidding regulations published by California’s 
state energy authority. If an older plant were selected to produce power in 
an auction among power providers for any given hour, it would also 
receive a contract to produce power for the two hours on either side. This 
was called “ramping up” and “ramping down” and was necessary because 
power plants cannot just be turned on and off—turbines need time to spin, 
both when coming on-line and going off-line.32 
JPMorgan’s traders knew that their aging plants could never compete 
on cost, so what could they do? FERC’s enforcement order chronicles 
twelve bidding strategies that took advantage of the market administrator’s 
bidding platform. In one of the strategies, the traders realized that if they 
submitted a below-market bid between 11:00 p.m. and midnight, 
California’s auction algorithm would select it, even though the bid was 
money-losing. The purpose was not to win the auction for that hour, but to 
take advantage of “ramping up” and “ramping down” rules. In their 
submission for the following day, the traders would enter bids at the 
system maximum ($999/MWh) for the hours after midnight, even though 
the market price was $12/MWh range, knowing the bidding regulations 
required payment to these aging plants.33 They made a fortune; JPMorgan 
ultimately agreed to a $125,000,000 disgorgement of unjust profits in 
addition to a $285,000,000 penalty.34 They also increased the cost to 
consumers during those five hours. These and other facts stipulated to by 
JPMorgan led FERC’s enforcement division to conclude that the firm’s  
                                                     
 29. See Dan Awrey et al., Between Law and Markets: Is There a Role for Culture and Ethics in 
Financial Regulation?, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191, 217 (2013) (The “norm of ‘other regarding’ behavior 
within financial services firms, [as] one which, to the fullest extent possible, attempts to induce firms 
to take into account the private and social costs of their decisions.”). 
 30. See Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement, Make-Whole Payments and 
Related Bidding Strategies, 144 FERC ¶ 61,068 (Jul. 13, 2013). 
 31. Id. at 4. 
 32. Id. at 9. 
 33. Id. at 10–11. 
 34. Id. at 1. 
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bids were not grounded in the normal forces of supply and demand, 
and they were expected to, and did, lose money at market rates. 
[JPMorgan’s] purpose in submitting the bids was not to make money 
based on market fundamentals, but to create artificial conditions that 
would cause the [market administrator] to pay [JPMorgan] outside 
the market at premium rates.35 
Who uses power in the middle of the night? Hospitals and other 
critical infrastructure—places like fire stations, police stations, water 
treatment plants, and other installations that cannot go off-line. Did the 
consequences of their trades ever occur to the energy traders at JPMorgan? 
Or were they playing a game that, in their culture, was independent of any 
real-world consequences? 
In each of the foregoing examples, technical rules arguably obscured 
the reasons for enacting the rules in the first place. Or, at the very least, 
they appear to have induced bankers to adopt a posture of gamesmanship. 
Technical rules raise questions about the limits of what laws and 
regulations can accomplish. The variations of this principle will be 
familiar to those schooled in public policy. It is impossible to create a rule 
for every situation. Gaps in a regulatory regime are inevitable.36 Groups 
will develop shared norms for filling those gaps. So, for that reason alone, 
we need to look to culture as well as laws for solutions. 
In addition, the pace of rulemaking is not always commensurate with 
the pace of rule-breaking. Focusing exclusively on rulemaking creates a 
risk of fighting last year’s scandal. What is more, laws are good at setting 
the outer limit of acceptable behavior—behavior that is clearly prohibited. 
They are less frequently and less reliably used to define what is optimal or 
what is good.37 A regime dependent on bright-line rules may, strangely, 
entice people to walk right up to the edge of a rule—or to find creative 
ways around the rules. A proliferation of technical rules prompts us to ask 
what we can do, not what we should do. Another way of looking at this 
problem is that technical rules also present a bright line where little 
judgment is required. When individuals do not have to apply judgment 
often, they get out of practice. We do not make good judgments when we 
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usually do not have to make judgments at all. Our moral or ethical muscle 
memory can grow weak without a workout. 
Enforcement actions cannot be the only remedy. Enforcement is 
after-the-fact, and its power to deter future misconduct is uncertain. 
Criminal enforcement requires proof of state-of-mind, which can be 
difficult to determine in a corporate setting when many people (including 
lawyers) are involved in decision-making. Prosecutors and civil 
enforcement authorities must make difficult resource allocation decisions 
that preclude them from responding to every offense, thus limiting the 
deterrent effect of their powers. 
In short, rules are necessary, but not sufficient. Culture—the shared 
norms of an organization—also contributes to behavior and decision 
making. We return, therefore, to a view espoused by Gerald Corrigan 
almost four decades ago: banks have “unique public responsibilities and 
may therefore be subject to implicit codes of conduct or explicit 
regulations that do not fall on other institutions.”38 There is arguably a 
need for greater emphasis on the implicit codes or norms that can support 
or undermine explicit regulations. 
C. A Role for Prudential Supervision? 
Other members of the New York Fed’s working group on culture 
were in the Supervision Group. While the lawyers tended to look at the 
limits and unintended effects of laws and regulations, supervisors began 
to consider culture through the lenses of microprudential and 
macroprudential supervision. 
As noted above, supervision is a distinctive feature of banking 
oversight.39 Supervisors at the Federal Reserve and many other central 
banks generally speak of two types of supervision: microprudential and 
macroprudential. Microprudential supervision refers to supervision that is 
largely firm-specific. Its purpose is to make sure that banks are “run in a 
‘prudent’ and ‘safe and sound’ manner and are not taking excessive 
risks.”40 This makes banks less likely to fail, avoiding adverse 
consequences to customers.41 Macroprudential supervision, by contrast, 
refers to supervision of the financial system. Its byword is “stability,” and 
it seeks to avoid another financial crisis by examining “(1) risks that can 
arise because of substantial interconnections among financial firms and (2) 
risks that can develop more broadly in the financial system, including at 
                                                     
 38. FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINN., ANNUAL REPORT OF 1982: ARE BANKS SPECIAL? (1982). 
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 40. See BD. OF GOVERNORS, supra note 1, at 57. 
 41. Id. at 58. 
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other financial institutions, in financial markets, and in the general market 
infrastructures.”42 
From a microprudential perspective, an assessment of a firm’s 
culture may provide insight into how to avoid certain risky behavior. One 
dimension of microprudential supervision where culture may be 
particularly relevant concerns a firm’s legal and compliance risks.43 
Employee misconduct—which in many instances may be the result of a 
poor corporate culture—often has legal consequences for firms. At the 
very least, it may consume resources on internal investigations, lead to 
costly controls and regulatory penalties, divert management attention from 
revenue-generating projects, and damage a firm’s public reputation. 
Early in our work in culture, we held several conversations with 
prosecutors and defense attorneys (many of whom were former 
prosecutors) about why corporate employees commit financial crimes. We 
heard some of what is described as a “cost-benefit” approach to following 
the law—that is, a conscious or subconscious weighing of the likelihood 
of getting caught against the possible outcomes. Largely, however, the 
answers struck us as more “cultural” and less calculating than we 
expected. Peer pressure, or the desire to be liked, was one common 
explanation, especially for more junior employees. A misguided desire to 
“help the company” also drove many not only to commit misconduct, but 
also to cover it up. Employees with track records of success also 
commonly experienced a fear of failure. These employees who committed 
misconduct may have felt pressure to preserve a self-image, apart from 
any financial benefit. Finally, the allegiances of the traders involved in the 
LIBOR and FX scandals, in particular, appeared to run toward one 
another, almost as a guild of traders, rather than to their employers or 
customers. In sum, an individual employee’s perceptions of peer practices, 
corporate expectations, professional loyalties, and personal reputation all 
contributed to poor decisions and behaviors. The factors, therefore, are 
relevant to the supervision of legal and compliance risk. 
Preet Bharara, the former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of 
New York, has presented a more structured view of the cultural factors 
that contribute to corporate crime. In his experience, three types of cultures 
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 43. The Board of Governors defines “compliance risk” as “the risk of regulatory sanctions, fines, 
penalties or losses resulting from failure to comply with laws, rules, regulations, or other supervisory 
requirements applicable to a financial institution,” and “legal risk” as “the potential that actions against 
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tend to yield misconduct: minimalism, formalism, and silence.44 
“Minimalism” is the attitude of doing as little as possible to comply with 
the rules. “Formalism” is the quality of equating what’s right with what’s 
legal. “Silence” is not raising your hand when you see something that is 
wrong. These three models of culture may also contribute to decisions and 
behaviors that are ill-advised, if not illegal. Remaining silent in a new 
product vetting meeting, for example, could limit the effectiveness of a 
discussion about the propriety of the product for certain types of 
customers. Focusing narrowly on technical minima in conducting 
customer due diligence reviews could lead analysts to overlook broader 
trends that may affect the firm’s risk management. 
There is another, perhaps more direct reason why culture matters to 
a firm’s legal risk. Federal prosecutors consider a corporation’s culture in 
deciding whether to indict the firm. Two of the ten factors in the 
Department of Justice’s “Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business 
Organizations” expressly address culture.45 When prosecutors consider a 
firm’s “history of similar misconduct,” one of the ten factors, they do so 
because “[a] history of similar misconduct may be probative of a corporate 
culture that encouraged, or at least condoned, such misdeeds, regardless 
of any compliance programs.”46 Similarly, in considering the 
“pervasiveness of wrongdoing,” another of the factors, prosecutors are 
advised that “the most important [factor] is the role and conduct of 
management. Although acts of even low-level employees may result in 
criminal liability, a corporation is directed by its management and 
management is responsible for a corporate culture in which criminal 
conduct is either discouraged or tacitly encouraged.”47 Given the scale of 
penalties for corporate crime, it makes sense that firms manage their 
cultures as part of managing their legal risk. 
Turning to macroprudential concerns, some aspects of culture 
appeared to be common to the industry, not unique to specific firms. 
Misconduct following the financial crisis was too frequent and widespread 
to blame credibly a few “bad apples.” Some common cultural norms may 
have also contributed to the financial crisis itself. As the Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission observed, industry norms—in particular, the “erosion 
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 45. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-28.300 (2018). 
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of standards of responsibility and ethics”—were partially to blame for the 
crisis.48 
The empirical case for considering culture as a macroprudential risk 
has not been highly elaborated. Still, around the time that the New York 
Fed’s work on culture began, others were already persuaded that some 
connection exists. The Financial Stability Board, for example, argued in 
2014 that “weaknesses in risk culture are often considered a root cause of 
the global financial crisis, headline risk and compliance events.”49 The 
same year, regulators in the United Kingdom observed that “the behaviour 
and culture within banks played a major role in the 2008–2009 financial 
crisis and in conduct scandals such as Payment Protection Insurance (PPI) 
mis-selling and the attempted manipulation of LIBOR.”50 
There were at least three arguments for treating industry culture as a 
macroprudential concern: First, a poor culture could undermine efforts to 
improve the stability of the financial system. Higher capital requirements, 
more realistic liquidity and funding analyses, and new compliance and 
reporting enhancements were important bulwarks against another 
systemic collapse. But, as the Financial Stability Board has stated, “fines 
and redress payments are losses that deplete the loss-absorbing capacity of 
a financial institution.”51 Moreover, if the people managing capital 
cushions fail to do so responsibly, or if powerful incentives exist to work 
around regulatory reporting requirements, these reforms could become 
illusory.52 
Second, the industry has, in the eyes of many, become characterized 
by misconduct, which has eroded its trustworthiness. One report by the 
Financial Stability Board observed that “the scale in some financial 
institutions has risen to a level that has the potential to create systemic 
risks and undermine trust in financial institutions and markets.”53 
Substitutes for trustworthiness tended to be expensive, putting pressure on 
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bank balance sheets and the ability of the industry to meet the needs of 
customers. As Bill Dudley explained, 
The short-term consequences of a lack of trustworthiness—such as 
supervisory orders, fines, or other civil or criminal penalties—may 
be finite and passing. The long-term consequences, however, may be 
more serious and enduring. Increased regulation—sometimes an 
inefficient substitute for trust—could limit the scope and scale of 
activities of financial firms. Employees may choose to apply their 
talents in other, less controversial fields instead of finance. 
Customers might look outside of traditional channels for financial 
services. Shareholders could downgrade their expectations about 
future returns and reduce their exposures to the financial sector.54 
These are long-term risks to financial stability. We tend to think of 
the long-term challenges facing financial services as technological. They 
may also be cultural. 
Third, and perhaps most important, pervasive misconduct erodes 
public support for intervention in times of crisis. Despite well-meaning 
efforts, financial crises appear unavoidable from a historical perspective. 
The public (or political) will to intervene depends on an assessment of the 
industry’s utility. In times of crisis, the question is ultimately very simple: 
Are we better off with the industry? If owing to a loss of trustworthiness, 
that answer is “no,” then financial stability may suffer. Our effectiveness 
to intervene in a crisis is limited by the public’s will to allow an 
intervention. Why would the public want us to intervene to save an 
industry that is not trusted? 
Regulators and supervisors should be concerned about the industry’s 
culture because an industry characterized by misconduct reflects poorly 
on its regulators and supervisors. Accountability demands that the official 
sector answer the question: “If misconduct is a grave problem, are you 
doing all you can to stop it?” If we are not looking at all the possible root 
causes of misconduct, including organizational culture, we may not be 
able to respond to that question with an honest “yes.” 
III. 
Central banks and other regulators and supervisors across the world 
have pursued varied approaches to culture. Volumes could be (and, in 
some cases, have been) written about these initiatives. Our contribution 
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here is organizing these efforts into categories and giving them context by 
arranging them on a spectrum to facilitate a studied comparison. In our 
view, the official sector has pursued five distinct approaches to culture, 
listed here in order of increasing prescription: (i) convening, speaking, and 
publishing; (ii) offering official guidance; (iii) incorporating behavioral 
science concepts in supervision; (iv) mandating self-assessment; and (v) 
issuing new accountability regulation. These approaches are not mutually 
exclusive and are often used in conjunction. 
A. Convening, Speaking, and Publishing 
The most common and least prescriptive approach is to use central 
bank or regulatory convening power and the bully pulpit. Many authorities 
have summoned the industry (a captive audience) to panels and 
conferences about the importance of culture, and many public sector 
leaders have been outspoken about the importance of the subject. In 
addition to Mark Carney,55 Norman Chan, the Chief Executive of the Hong 
Kong Monetary Authority,56 and Christine Lagarde, the President of the 
European Central Bank and former Managing Director of the International 
Monetary Fund,57 are two outspoken proponents of the importance of 
improving culture in financial services. 
Some public authorities have reported publicly on the results of 
inquiries into supervised firms. The Central Bank of Ireland, for example, 
examined five retail banks in light of a post-crisis mortgage scandal.58 Its 
report criticized the banks for a culture that prized short-term financial 
goals over consumer protection and created a sense of over-optimism 
when those short-term goals were exceeded.59 In addition, the banks had 
failed to manage cultural norms ahead of misconduct, resulting in a 
“firefighting” approach to scandal.60 The Central Bank of Ireland 
recommended that the five banks pursue stronger diversity initiatives to 
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combat organizational silos and evidence of “group think” within those 
silos.61 
Another example is the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority’s 
report of its inquiry into the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, a bank 
with multiple misconduct scandals.62 The report concluded that sustained 
success, especially through the financial crisis, “dulled the senses of the 
institution.” Year after year, the firm under-valued and under-invested in 
compliance and other risk management functions. As a result, the firm 
made key decisions without adequate challenge, did not hold individuals 
accountable, and overlooked customer interests and complaints. These 
flaws were the product of “cultural factors,” many of which were also 
identified by the Central Bank of Ireland in its report. Beyond 
complacency attributable to sustained financial success, the 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia suffered from a lack of self-reflection, 
a reactive approach to risks, and an overemphasis on consensus at the 
expense of diverse points of view. 
B. Official Guidance 
Beyond speeches and publications, several authorities have issued 
official guidance about culture. Guidance is an agency’s official statement 
of policy. It often contains interpretations of laws and regulations, and 
recommendations for compliance, but it lacks the legal power to compel 
adherence. 
For example, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority published 
guidance on culture in March 2017.63 Its approach sets out three pillars for 
a sound corporate culture: governance, incentives, and assessment. The 
governance pillar emphasized traditional notions—“tone from the top,” 
for example—and provided more granular recommendations, such as a 
board-level committee dedicated to culture. The committee would “review 
and confirm the effectiveness of the overall culture enhancement 
initiatives pursued by the institution.”64 Regarding incentives, the 
guidance recommended a separate performance rating for adherence to 
corporate values. A separate performance rating would focus the attention 
of managers and staff on demonstrating their embrace of those principles 
throughout the year. The guidance also recommended monetary rewards 
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and recognition for staff demonstrating exemplary behavior. For the third 
pillar—assessment—the Hong Kong guidance encouraged firms to 
implement escalation policies that include confidential channels so that 
staff could raise concerns about illegal or unethical conduct without fear 
of reprisal. 
Another example below explains the Financial Conduct Authority’s 
guidance on the United Kingdom’s new “Conduct Rules.” The official 
rules are framed positively (“You shall,” as opposed to “You shall not”) 
and at a very high level (for example, “You shall act with integrity”). 
Official guidance, however, offers multiple examples, drawn from actual 
supervisory findings and enforcement actions, of how each of those 
principles may be violated—the “You shall nots.” For example, Rule 1 is 
“You shall act with integrity.” Official guidance supplements these 
principles with real world examples of potential violations. The rule of 
integrity would prohibit, among other things, falsifying documents, 
mismarking the value of investments or trading positions, providing 
altered prices on illiquid or off-exchange contracts, providing false or 
inaccurate information to a regulator, failing to disclose personal account 
dealings, designing transactions to disguise breaches of law or regulation, 
or failing to inform a customer about a material issue.65 
C. Behavioral Science and Supervision 
The Dutch central bank pioneered behavioral science into 
supervision (De Nederlandsche Bank, or “DNB”). Its supervisors literally 
wrote the book on incorporating behavior science in supervision.66 
The DNB launched its Governance, Culture, and Organizational 
Behavior Supervision Program in 2010. The program team is comprised 
of experienced supervisors and industrial or organizational psychologists. 
Its premise is that behavior has a predictive value with respect to future 
performance—i.e., risky behavior may already be apparent before 
financial performance is compromised. Therefore, it makes sense to 
examine behavior to mitigate bad outcomes. 
The Dutch approach focused on two aspects of culture: group 
dynamics and change. In the first, supervisors look for “patterns in 
decision-making, leadership, communication, group dynamics and 
mindsets of . . . management boards,” assess the risks of those patterns to 
that particular institution, and recommend changes.67 These groups tend to 
exhibit similar patterns of behavior, including CEO dominance, a lack of 
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effective challenge, and a lack of self-reflection. In the second type of 
review, supervisors assess “the ability of financial institutions to 
implement major changes.”68 Changes are not only necessary in times of 
acute stress. Change has more generally become a way of life for financial 
services firms, which must contend with new competition, new customer 
expectations, and new technology. The key concern in this review is how 
firms are able to set priorities among the many dynamic conditions they 
face. 
These reviews are data driven. To conduct a review, DNB specialists 
consult with the dedicated supervisory team to select one or two concrete 
decisions for review.69 Examples might include a decision on strategy 
(whether or not to restart a particular line of business), personnel (a c-suite 
selection viewed by the lead supervisor as unsuccessful), or a cultural issue 
illustrating the mindset of the organization (people do not feel that they 
have job security). The team then looks at who was involved in the 
decision, what process, rationale, or influence was used to arrive at the 
decision, and any documents available about the decision. Much of the 
review comprises desk research,70 but the DNB also uses self-assessment 
forms, interviews, and, to a limited extent, direct observations of board or 
executive committee meetings.71 In presenting their findings, the DNB 
specialists do not opine on the wisdom or technical soundness of the 
outcome of a decision—although those aspects of a decision may be 
reviewed by supervisors for other purposes. Rather, the specialists offer 
feedback and suggestions on the process for arriving at a particular 
decision based on observable behaviors, the norms, and the group 
dynamics that those behaviors evidence. The DNB has implemented 
safeguards to avoid individual examiner bias and intuition from 
influencing supervisory conclusions, including rigorous peer challenge.72 
D. Mandatory Self-Assessment 
Since 2014, some foreign supervisors have made self-assessment 
mandatory for supervised firms. The United Kingdom’s Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) introduced its “5 Conduct Questions 
Programme” in 2015.73 It is, in our view, a practice leader. The five 
questions that target the risk of misconduct are: 
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1. What proactive steps do you take as a firm to identify the conduct 
risks inherent within your business? 
2. How do you encourage the individuals who work in front, 
middle, back office, control, and support functions to feel and be 
responsible for managing the conduct of their business? 
3. What support (broadly defined) does the firm put in place to 
enable those who work for it to improve the conduct of their 
business or function? 
4. How does the Board and [senior management] gain oversight of 
the conduct of business within their organization and, equally 
importantly, how does the Board or [senior management] 
consider the conduct implications of the strategic decisions that 
they make? 
5. Has the firm assessed whether there are any other activities that 
it undertakes that could undermine strategies put in place to 
improve conduct?74 
The FCA poses these questions to banks in the wholesale market—
approximately thirty firms. The purpose of the questions is to prompt 
discussion within firms about culture and conduct and their effects on risk 
management. For three years running, the FCA has published summaries 
of firm responses and a horizontal supervisory assessment.75 The key 
message in the 2018 report was that some firms have fallen behind peers 
in their efforts to mitigate misconduct risk.76 The report provided examples 
of both strong and weak approaches as a benchmark. A focus of the 2019 
report was on “speak-up culture”—”the willingness and opportunities for 
staff to challenge and discuss issues as a normal day-to-day activity, 
including escalating issues where needed.”77 The FCA found that, in 
general, firms had programs that facilitated and channeled employee 
feedback and whistleblowing, but struggled to change the mindset that this 
manner of communication was acceptable and encouraged. 
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Mandatory self-assessment is a feature of the Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority’s recent update of its supervisory program on culture.78 
Supervised firms must ask how their governance structures and policies 
influence their organizational culture, implement changes, and report on 
their progress. Firms are encouraged to include lessons learned in the 
course of their work as a way of avoiding a “check-the-box” approach to 
complying with the new self-assessment requirement. Supervisors will 
review reports, conduct focus groups to confirm their content, and provide 
feedback to firms. 
E. Individual Accountability Regimes 
Individual accountability regimes impose new statutory and 
regulatory duties on individual bankers and new oversight responsibilities 
on supervisors. A focus on accountability for senior leaders, in particular, 
may prompt them to invest time and other resources in understanding and 
mitigating the root causes of prior misconduct. 
In recent years, the United Kingdom has overhauled its financial 
regulation to promote a culture of responsibility and trustworthiness in 
financial services. New legislation mandated regulators to introduce 
tougher rules in relation to individual accountability.79 Those regulators, 
in turn, issued new rules designed expressly to “shape the culture, 
standards and policies of a firm as a whole and . . . promote more positive 
behaviours that actively support the regulators’ statutory objectives.”80 
The United Kingdom’s new individual accountability regime81 has 
three parts. First, the regime utilizes enforceable “Conduct Rules” that 
apply to almost all bank employees.82 As described above, the rules are 
high-level principles, written in general terms to allow for wide 
applicability across diverse lines of business and job functions. The FCA 
has encouraged firms to provide training tailored to how those rules apply 
                                                     
 78. Letter from H.K. Monetary Auth., to the Chief Exec., All Authorized Institutions 1 (Mar. 2, 
2017), https://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/doc/key-information/guidelines-and-circular/2018/2018 
1219e1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9U6-5BMP]. 
 79. See generally Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act, 2013 (c. 33) (Eng.). 
 80. BANK OF ENG. PRUDENTIAL AUTH. & FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., CONSULTATION PAPER: 
STRENGTHENING ACCOUNTABILITY IN BANKING: A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR 
INDIVIDUALS 38 (2014). 
 81. The discussion of the U.K. “senior managers and certification” regime in this article focuses 
on that regime as it applies to banks. The regime also currently applies to building societies, credit 
unions, and insurers. All other regulated firms will become subject to a version of the regime from 
December 2019. The extended regime is meant to be proportionate, so different categories of firms 
will be subject to different requirements depending on their activities, size, and risk profiles. 
 82. See generally FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., CODE OF CONDUCT § 2 (2019). The express purpose of 
the U.K.’s new Conduct Rules is to “shape the culture standards and policies of a firm as a whole 
and . . . promote more positive behaviours that actively support the regulators’ statutory objectives.” 
BANK OF ENG. PRUDENTIAL AUTH. & FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 80, § 5.2. 
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in particular business areas.83 Firms are required to report to regulators any 
disciplinary action84 taken as a result of breaches of the Conduct Rules.85 
Second, a new “Senior Managers Regime” requires candidates for 
certain board and executive management positions to receive pre-approval 
from a regulator.86 Once appointed, they become subject to a “duty of 
responsibility” to take reasonable steps to prevent regulatory breaches in 
the areas of the firm for which they are responsible.87 Senior managers 
may also face criminal liability for making a decision that causes a firm to 
fail,88 albeit this would only apply in a relatively narrow set of 
circumstances. The keystone of the Senior Managers Regime is a 
mandatory and formally documented allocation of responsibilities. Firms 
must ensure that there are no gaps in accountability for their activities, as 
well as allocate a number of responsibilities that have been “prescribed” 
by the regulators, which represent priority areas of regulatory focus.89 This 
process gives supervisors insight into the actual responsibilities of a firm’s 
senior leadership. It also enables regulators to judge the appropriateness 
of an individual for a certain role. Moreover, it provides clarity as to who 
among a firm’s leadership can be held individually accountable for illegal 
or otherwise unsound conduct in a particular area. In other words, the 
allocation of responsibilities answers the question of where the buck stops. 
Two of the prescribed responsibilities mandated by regulation address 
culture.90 Including culture on a regulatory list of leadership 
responsibilities, make it very likely that “culture” will be on the permanent 
agenda of a firm’s management committee and board of directors. It also 
places a personal onus on the relevant Senior Managers to demonstrate 
that they are taking reasonable steps to lead the development of a firm’s 
culture and overseeing its adoption in day-to-day management. 
Third, firms must administer a “Certification Regime” where they 
regularly assess the “fitness and propriety” of other individuals who could 
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pose a risk of significant harm to the firm or its customers.91 An important 
element of certification is a requirement that firms check references for the 
past six years of employment history before certifying that employees are 
“fit and proper”92 (the obligation to check references also applies to 
prospective Senior Managers and other non-executive directors). Like the 
New York Fed’s database proposal, the U.K.’s new reference rules impose 
two new legal duties on regulated firms: a duty to inquire of past 
employers (including non-financial companies) and a duty to provide 
information. References must disclose all information that would be 
relevant to an assessment of whether an individual is fit and proper. Unlike 
the New York Fed’s proposal, employers will not receive immunity for 
the contents of such references. They face the same liability to former 
employees that they would without any legal duty to disclose. They also 
owe a general duty to a prospective employer to write a reference that is 
accurate and, taken as a whole, not misleading. A firm may, therefore, find 
itself in the unenviable position of treble legal risk. A former employee 
may sue for including too much information in a reference, a prospective 
employer may disagree and sue for including too little, and a regulator may 
scrutinize the reference for compliance with legal minima. 
IV. 
The New York Fed’s work on culture has proceeded along several 
lines decidedly on the less intrusive end of the spectrum. 
A. Convening Power and the Bully Pulpit 
From the outset, the New York Fed’s goal has been to shine a 
spotlight on the issue of corporate culture. It has relied principally on 
convening industry participants and other interested parties and in 
advocating for heightened attention to culture through public speeches. 
The New York Fed has hosted several major conferences for the 
industry and regulators on the topic of culture. Prominent officials have 
delivered keynote addresses. CEOs, directors, and asset managers 
participate on panels, with some participants returning year after year. The 
purpose of these discussions is to exchange ideas about what works and 
what does not and to identify opportunities for productive collaboration. 
For example, Betsy Duke joined two panels in which she discussed the 
challenges of being a director and later chairman at Wells Fargo following 
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its customer account scandal.93 Supervisors, prosecutors, and academics 
have also joined panel discussions to explain their approaches to culture. 
Detailed summaries for each of these conferences and many video 
excerpts are available on the New York Fed’s public website.94 
The conferences have also taught us just how difficult the topic of 
culture is. One recurring theme is the potential for ethics and markets to 
be irreconcilable. That is, there are only so many times a market 
participant can say “no” to a business opportunity based on an ethical 
principle and expect to remain in business. At some point, competitors will 
say “yes” seeing the business opportunity. Over the long-term, this 
dynamic can reduce standards in an industry. Federal Reserve Vice 
Chairman Stanley Fischer explored this theme at the New York Fed’s 
annual culture conference in 2015.95 He distributed to the audience a quote 
from a book by Nobel Laureates George Akerlof and Robert Schiller: 
Whether or not businessmen have good (or bad) morals is not the 
subject of this book, although sometimes both of these sides will 
appear. Instead, we see the basic problem as pressures for less than 
scrupulous behavior that is incentivized in competitive markets. They 
are terrific at incentivizing and rewarding businessmen heroes with 
innovative new products for which there is real need. However, 
unregulated free markets rarely reward a different kind of heroism, 
of those who restrain themselves from taking advantage of 
customers’ psychological or informational weaknesses. Because of 
competitive pressures, managers who restrain themselves in this way 
tend to be replaced by others with fewer moral qualms. Civil society 
and social norms do place some brakes on such phishing; but in the 
resulting market equilibrium, if there is an opportunity to phish, even 
firms guided by those with real moral integrity will usually have to 
do so in order to compete and survive.96 
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In a discussion with Christine Lagarde, Vice Chairman Fischer asked 
whether there was something fundamental in markets that was 
incompatible with ethics.97 That is, does market competition inevitably 
lead to a race to the bottom? If one participant is not willing to do 
“whatever it takes” to make a buck, the next participant will. And, there 
are only so many times that a market participant can say “no”—only so 
many opportunities that can be passed up—before going out of business. 
If that is true, is postcrisis misconduct an inescapably downward trend? 
The New York Fed has also organized two less publicized forums to 
discuss culture. The Supervisors Roundtable is a semi-annual meeting of 
senior supervisors from approximately twenty agencies from many 
jurisdictions. Its purpose is to share approaches to the supervision of 
culture and to develop a toolkit. The newest convening effort is a business 
school-industry working group called the Education and Industry Forum 
on Financial Services Culture.98 Its goal is to encourage universities and 
financial firms to work on promoting ethics as a skill set, both in the 
classroom and in employer training. The initiative began a few years ago 
with some rather uncomfortable meetings, in which academics and 
bankers sat around a table saying, “It’s your fault. No, it’s your fault.” 
Now, both sides are eager to work together and the New York Fed helps 
facilitate that discussion on an ongoing basis. 
In addition to engaging bankers and supervisors, we have also tried 
to interest lawyers in the topic of the culture of financial services. For 
example, in 2016, we partnered with the Federal Bar Council in New York 
City to host a seminar addressing how banking lawyers can import 
professional, ethical standards to the clients they serve. The discussion 
picked up on discussions in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
about the wisdom of treating banking as a “profession”—complete with 
ethical codes, self-governing bodies, and entrance standards. Judge Jed S. 
Rakoff moderated a two-hour panel discussion that covered the following 
topics. 
1. Should banking lawyers have special responsibilities to the 
public? This discussion challenged the traditional client-centric 
obligations by asking whether lawyers who work in an industry with so 
many public responsibilities should also owe a heightened duty to the 
public as well as to their clients. At the very least, under the Model Rules 
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of Professional Conduct of the American Bar Association (Model Rules), 
a lawyer cannot “prudently ignore the interests of the investing public in 
advising . . . clients. . . . [I]n rendering advice, the lawyer must be 
conscious of the client’s own duties to the investing public and the 
consequences to the client of violating those duties.”99 
2. When do lawyers get in the way of reform? We have observed that, 
when speaking to banking audiences, this topic generates a lot of interest. 
The panel discussion covered two scenarios: First, how does the increased 
assertion of the attorney–client privilege affect public sector inquiries? 
Second, in a private law setting, how does legal advice restrict a culture 
reform agenda—for example, through limiting what is disclosed about 
employee discipline? 
3. Should banks require their attorneys to advise employees on non-
legal considerations? This discussion debated whether banks should 
require in-house and outside counsel to advise on the social and moral 
dimensions of their decisions. Both the Model Rules and the Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers (Restatement) permit attorneys to 
advise clients on the basis of non-legal factors, including the “moral” or 
“social” dimensions of a decision—that is, advice that beyond what is 
strictly illegal or arguably legal.100 Panelists discussed whether giving 
attorneys an express mandate to raise the moral and social dimensions of 
banker decisions would increase awareness of the broader consequences 
of financial decisions. It was also observed that the mandate might combat 
the perception among some bankers that attorneys are purely 
“transaction[al] engineers.”101 
4. Should Congress create a statutory self-evaluation privilege for 
financial institutions? Every state offers hospitals an evidentiary privilege 
against the disclosure of “mortality and morbidity” evaluations.102 The 
purpose is to enable discussion of errors and root causes without fear of 
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litigation. Two states—Delaware and Louisiana—offer a similar privilege 
to banks.103 The panel and audience debated whether an assurance of 
confidentiality would promote thorough and candid discussions of 
mistakes and ways to avoid them in the future. A model statute follows 
this essay as Exhibit A. 
In addition, senior leaders of the New York Fed have given more 
than twenty-five public speeches about culture in financial services.104 
This number does not include participation in panel discussions at various 
conferences held around the world. Our colleagues also attempt to collect 
significant speeches and reports about banking culture by other official 
sector leaders. This effort has produced a website dedicated to sharing 
information about the culture.105 
B. Publication 
Some of its staff have also published a whitepaper arguing that 
“cultural capital” as an intangible asset is a fair topic for supervision.106 
Cultural capital was one idea included by the FCA in a March 2018 
discussion paper entitled Transforming Culture in Financial Services.107 
Contributors included not only supervisors and economists, but behavioral 
scientists, bank CEOs and directors, business professors and ethicists, and 
leaders of corporate governance non-profits. Essays in that paper covered 
the elements of a “good” culture in financial services, the roles of 
supervisors and regulators, and many ideas on how firms can make their 
culture initiatives more effective. 
The New York Fed has also contributed to several international 
publications. Two that stand out are the development of the FX Global 
Code and recent work by the Financial Stability Board about misconduct, 
risk, and culture. 
The FX Global Code (the Code) is a set of principles designed to 
improve conduct by participants in the foreign exchange market.108 Staff 
from across the New York Fed contributed to the effort coordinated by the 
Bank for International Settlements’ Market Committee’s FX Working 
Group. Adherence to the Code is voluntary, and the central banks that 
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contributed to the effort have strongly encouraged market participants to 
adopt it. 
Staff from the New York Fed have also participated for several years 
in a Financial Stability Board project called the Working Group for 
Governance Frameworks. Beginning in 2016 and led by Jeremy Rudin, 
Canada’s Superintendent of Financial Institutions, the group has since 
published two reports. The first was an overview of how misconduct risk 
is addressed across firms and regulators.109 The report also included a 
review of scientific literature about the root causes of misconduct. It 
recommended three areas for further study: (i) “rolling bad apples,” (ii) 
responsibility mapping, and (iii) cultural drivers and risk factors. A follow-
up report published in 2018 addressed each area in greater detail.110 
Framed as a “tool kit,” the 2018 report contained practical steps that 
financial institutions and their supervisors could take to address each issue. 
All of the options contained a common theme: Culture needs to be a 
priority among an organization’s leaders who can bring the full resources 
of an institution to bear on the problem. 
Even before the Financial Stability Board’s work, New York Fed 
staff had paid attention to the “rolling bad apple” phenomenon for several 
years. The Financial Stability Board paper defined rolling bad apples as 
“individuals who engage in misconduct but are able to obtain subsequent 
employment elsewhere without disclosing their earlier misconduct to the 
new employer.”111 Banks, like many employers, do not volunteer 
information about their employees. Providing references creates a legal 
risk. A misstatement or omission in a report could provide a basis for 
employees to sue for economic injury to reputation or employment 
prospects. Even where some disclosure is required—for licensed broker-
dealers, for example—the “official version” of events is often heavily 
negotiated and provides little insight into an employee’s actual conduct.112 
This type of reference offers limited value to a future employer in 
considering an applicant’s suitability. 
We were aware at a high level that some areas of wholesale banking 
and trading are noteworthy for the frequency with which bankers find new 
employment at competing firms. For example, Thomas Hayes, the London 
trader who manipulated LIBOR at UBS, the Royal Bank of Canada, and 
Citi before being prosecuted for fraud, is one of the most notorious 
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itinerant traders to emerge from recent “reference rate” scandals.113 
Indeed, the movement of bankers across firms, but within pockets of the 
industry, may have facilitated the collusion seen in the LIBOR and FX 
scandals. In workplaces characterized by high employee turnover, 
employers come and go but relationships endure. Personal networks 
facilitate future employment. When loyalty to those networks supplants 
duty to an employer or customers, the risk of corruption increases. 
A working paper from the National Bureau of Economic Research 
provided insight into misconduct by Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (FINRA)-registered brokers and investment advisors.114 
According to that paper, roughly one in thirteen registered brokers and 
investment advisors—who, as a group, constitute approximately 10% of 
total employment in financial services—had at least one instance of prior 
misconduct on their public records. What is more, 38% of registrants with 
misconduct records were repeat offenders. And, although 48% of 
registrants with misconduct records left their jobs within a year of 
disclosure, 44% of departed employees found work in the industry within 
a year, albeit at smaller or less prestigious firms. This is consistent with 
our anecdotal understanding based on LIBOR and FX investigations. The 
labor market may undo some of the effects of firm discipline. 
To promote more effective references and more informed hiring 
decisions, several New York Fed officials have favored creating durable 
records of misconduct.115 The idea, at its core, is to overcome the fact that 
when bankers change firms, they are often able to leave their conduct 
records behind. If there was a central database maintained by the official 
sector, but accessible by private banks, prospective employers could check 
whether an applicant had any record of misconduct that might raise 
legitimate questions about poor behavior in the future. Poor conduct would 
have consequences over a longer time horizon, and wrongdoers would 
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bear greater accountability for their misdeeds. We explain the idea for a 
database in greater detail below. 
C. Propose Solutions 
Finally, the New York Fed has used publications and speeches to 
propose ideas to the industry to help address persistent problems. In the 
fall of 2014, Bill Dudley proposed four ideas116: 
1. A standard industry survey of culture, which may create a 
benchmark for measuring behavior. Most, if not all, large financial 
institutions—like most if not all, large companies—conduct internal 
assessments about their cultures. The word “culture” may not appear in 
the titles or descriptions of those assessments, but they aim to measure 
group norms and employee attitudes. That data, however, remains within 
firms. Even if they were compared side-by-side, the analysis might not be 
fruitful because the questions and methods vary from firm to firm. 
Undertaking a standard survey in addition to proprietary assessments 
would enable industry-wide comparison and, moreover, would be a sign 
of the industry’s joint commitment to improving culture and conduct. 
Although not attempted in the United States, the project is well 
underway in the United Kingdom. The Banking Standards Board recently 
published its third annual review, in which more than 72,000 employees 
in the financial services sector participated.117 That report contains 
aggregated and anonymized results of a standard thirty-six question 
survey, broken down by key demographics. Participating firms also 
receive detailed private reports, including dynamic electronic dashboards 
that are tailored to the firm’s specific information requests. While firm-
specific information is strictly non-public, the quality of the analysis in the 
public report speaks to the value of the exercise. The lack of a similar 
project in the United States is glaring and, frankly, brings into question the 
industry’s commitment to improving its culture. 
2. Longer deferrals of compensation, for up to ten years, and a 
performance bond for senior leaders and material risk-takers. These were 
non-regulatory proposals that firms might undertake voluntarily to account 
for latent financial and misconduct risks in pay packages. Lengthy 
deferrals would allow time for tail risks to mature and make “claw-backs” 
easier to accomplish. Ten years was a conservative estimate of the length 
of time it could take for tail risk to mature or for misconduct to be 
uncovered. Since Dudley proposed the idea in 2014, the United Kingdom 
has, by regulation, imposed a seven-year deferral on at least 40% of 
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variable compensation for material risk-takers that are subject to the 
Senior Managers Regime, with vesting after three years on a pro-rata 
basis.118 
“Performance bonds” operate like security deposits on a rental 
apartment. They promote prudent decisions and behaviors by placing a 
significant quantum of money at risk. Dudley’s idea was that money 
deferred by bankers could be used to satisfy criminal or regulatory fines, 
partially removing the burden from shareholders, or to recapitalize a firm 
in a crisis. The annual amounts at stake for each employee need not be 
large. Small amounts, compounded over the years, could result in a 
significant resource for a firm.119 Placing funds at risk, however, could 
lead to an overall increase in compensation to make up for the portion 
placed into a performance bond. Firms would have to balance performance 
bonds against pressures to limit the overall volume of banker 
compensation. 
A version of the performance bond appeared in Citi’s 2015 Proxy 
Statement as a shareholder proposal.120 Executive officers would be 
required to defer a portion of their compensation for at least ten years, 
during which time the money could be used to satisfy fines for illegal 
conduct regardless of the personal responsibility of any officer.121 Citi’s 
management argued that the proposal would impede the firm’s ability to 
attract and retain executives, and that the firm’s claw-back policy already 
allowed the firm to cover fines and costs for illegal or imprudent 
conduct.122 Ultimately, Citi’s board recommended that shareholders reject 
the proposal, which was, indeed, the outcome.123 
3. A database of financial sector misconduct.124 The core of this idea 
is a new federal statute that would impose two legal duties on supervised 
financial institutions: a duty to report misconduct when an employee 
leaves the firm and a duty to check the registry before hiring. Together, 
these duties aim to combat the problem of “rolling bad apples,” described 
above. The statute extends the time horizon for the consequences of 
misconduct by creating a record of bad behavior, hopefully creating a 
personal stake in the success of corporate controls and prompting more 
careful decisions. It does not, however, preclude future employment, 
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although that may very well be the appropriate result of serious 
misconduct. It just makes it less likely that a future employer could plead 
ignorance of prior misconduct. 
The keys to the success of a misconduct database are due process 
protections for employees, enforcement consequences for reporting 
misinformation or using the database for improper purposes, and a safe 
harbor for employers who report in good faith. We have addressed these 
features publicly,125 and have included a further summary as an appendix 
to this Article. 
Industry representatives on the Federal Advisory Council supported 
the idea for a misconduct database in 2015.126 So far, however, no bills 
have been introduced in Congress. 
4. A mandatory industry ban against persons convicted of a crime of 
dishonesty. Under current law—Section 19 of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act—a person convicted of a crime of dishonesty is prohibited 
from working in a federally insured depository institution, a bank holding 
company, and one or two other types of institutions.127 Employment is not 
prohibited at broker-dealers, investment advisors, exchanges, or other 
firms overseen by the Federal Reserve, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and other federal regulators. Section 19 might be amended 
to cover any “activity that is financial in nature or incidental to a financial 
activity,” a phrase borrowed from the Bank Holding Company Act.128 So, 
it would no longer matter what type of financial firm a banker wants to 
work for—supervised or “shadow.” If convicted of a crime of dishonesty, 
future employment in finance would be prohibited. The portion of Section 
19 that permits courts to lift the ban would remain. 
V. 
John C. Williams, who succeeded Bill Dudley as President of the 
New York Fed in 2018, has argued that “good times” can feed the root 
causes of misconduct in the same way that Irish retail banks and the 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia experienced: “[It] can look like 
                                                     
 125. See generally Held, supra note 37. 
 126. Record of Meeting: Fed. Advisory Council & Bd. of Governors, N.Y. FED. RESERVE 10 
(May 8, 2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/fac-20150512.pdf [https://perma.cc/YT 
5Z-UQV9] (“At the industry level, one significant and immediate step would be a coordinated effort 
to establish a comprehensive employee database across banks that could prevent bad actors from 
moving from one firm to another and allow for consistent regulatory supervision . . . . A regulator-
sanctioned or -sponsored mechanism . . . with consistent and transparent standards covering various 
industry sectors, could assist both regulators and the industry in monitoring and preempting recidivist 
behavior.”). 
 127. 12 U.S.C. § 1829 (2018). 
 128. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4) (2018). 
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everything’s coming up roses, even when an uncomfortable reality lies 
beneath.”129 
As we write this Article, roughly one year after John Williams added 
his voice to the chorus, the good times continue. Unfortunately, so do 
misconduct scandals. Recent headlines concern fraud in Malaysia’s 
sovereign wealth fund130 and money laundering through the Baltic 
branches of Scandinavian banks.131 Or, even more recently, we have seen 
the conviction of the former head of HSBC’s foreign exchange trading 
desk for lying to a bank customer about material facts in a foreign 
exchange transaction.132 Even more troublingly, a similar case brought 
against the head of Barclay’s foreign exchange trading desk was deemed 
legally insufficient because “BS-[ing]” was so common in the foreign 
exchange market that no one could have been reasonably induced to rely 
on a trader’s misrepresentations.133 Clearly, misconduct and cultures that 
contribute to misconduct remain an important and unresolved issue. 
We previewed at the start of this Article some questions that would 
benefit from academic input. In light of the background we have provided 
on the work of the New York Federal Reserve and other public authorities, 
we return to them with some additional explanation. 
1. What are we missing about culture? How can we make a stronger 
case that culture matters in financial services? Are there angles and 
insights we have overlooked? Are there aspects of our work that appear 
simplistic or uninformed? Are there canonical texts that would give a more 
solid foundation to our work? What are the really exciting areas of 
research about the root causes of behavior? 
2. What else should we and our colleagues at the New York Fed do? 
Do you have ideas for projects that would help academics or the industry 
in their work on culture? Are there specific types of conferences that 
                                                     
 129. John C. Williams, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Remarks at 
Governance and Culture Reform Conference: Now is The Time For Banking Reform (June 28, 2018) 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2018/wil180618 [https://perma.cc/CS47-ZVBZ]. 
 130. See Stefania Palma, 1MDB Explained: Timeline of Malaysia’s Financial Scandal, FIN. 
TIMES (Feb. 10, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/fce8018c-2b4e-11e9-88a4-c32129756dd8 (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2019). 
 131. See Richard Milne & David Winter, Danske: Anatomy of a Money Laundering Scandal, 
FIN. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/519ad6ae-bcd8-11e8-94b2-17176fbf93f5 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2019). 
 132. United States v. Johnson, 939 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 133. United States v. Bogucki, No. 18-cr-00021-CRB-1, 2019 WL 1024959, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 4, 2019) (“Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, there is simply 
no evidence in the record that, in the context of an arms-length transaction in which the parties bluffed 
and ‘BS-[ed]’ each other, operated as principals, looked out for their own interests, and understood 
the other party to be ‘posturing,’ rather than providing strictly true information, someone in [the 
customer’s] position could, objectively, be induced by the statements in this case to part with money 
or property.”). 
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would be helpful? Can we help create research opportunities? Are there 
market shortcomings that would benefit from new proposals? 
3. How do we know if there has been progress? In 2014, Bill Dudley 
argued that an absence of new scandals would be a good start.134 That said, 
the absence of a catastrophe may not be proof of competence. Are there 
other indicators that would show the progress on culture? Are there ways 
for the industry to rebuild and demonstrate its trustworthiness? 
We welcome your input on these questions.  
                                                     
 134. Dudley, supra note 115. 
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Appendix A — Proposed Self-Evaluation Statute 
(1) Peer Evaluation Program. Every supervised financial institution shall 
maintain a coordinated program for the identification and prevention of 
illegal, unsafe, or unsound practices (Peer Evaluation Program). Such a 
program shall include at least the following: 
 
(a) The establishment of a quality assurance committee with the 
responsibility to review the services rendered by the financial 
institution in order to improve the quality of financial services offered 
to the public and to prevent illegal, unsafe, or unsound practices, 
including violations of supervisory guidance, a code of conduct, or 
industry conduct standards. Such a committee shall ensure that 
information gathered pursuant to the program is utilized to review 
and to revise the institution’s policies and procedures. At least one 
member of the institution’s management committee must participate 
in the committee; 
 
(b) A financial services staff sanctions procedure through which a 
finding of intentional or repeated misconduct (i) is included in an 
annual employee evaluation and, (ii) in the case of illegal conduct, is 
reported to the appropriate regulatory and criminal authorities, both 
foreign and domestic; 
 
(c) The maintenance and continuous collection of information 
concerning (i) the financial institution’s experience with negative risk 
and compliance outcomes and incidents injurious to the institution or 
its customers and (ii) customer complaints; 
 
(d) Education programs explaining the reviews conducted by the 
quality assurance committee and other issues related to consumer 
protection, fraud prevention, staff responsibility to report violations 
of law, regulation, or the institution’s code of conduct, legal and 
regulatory compliance, and improved communication with 
customers; and 
 
(e) Continuing education programs for financial services 
professionals and the institution’s management in their areas of 
specialty. 
 
(2) Limitation on liability. Any person who, in good faith and without 
malice, provides information to further the purposes of the Peer Evaluation 
Program or who, in good faith and without malice, participates on the 
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quality assurance committee shall not be subject to an action for civil 
damages or other relief in any court or in any other proceeding as a result 
of such activity. Any financial institution, or any person acting on behalf 
of such financial institution who, in good faith and without malice, takes 
or fails to take any action as a result of a review conducted pursuant to 
subdivision one of this section, shall not be subject to an action for civil 
damages or other legal or equitable relief as a result of such action or 
failure to act. 
 
(3) Confidentiality. 
 
(a) The information required to be collected and maintained pursuant 
to subdivision one of this section, and any review required pursuant 
to subdivision one of this section, shall be kept confidential and shall 
not be released except to state or federal banking supervisors. 
Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, none of the 
records, documentation, or committee actions or records created or 
maintained pursuant to subdivision one of this section shall be subject 
to discovery in any criminal or civil investigation or litigation 
pending in any state or federal court, except investigations or 
proceedings conducted by state or federal banking supervisors related 
to compliance with this section. 
 
(b) No person in attendance at a meeting pursuant to subdivision one 
of this section shall be required to testify as to what transpired thereat. 
The prohibition relating to the discovery of testimony shall not apply 
to the statements made by any person in attendance at such a meeting 
who is a plaintiff in an action or proceeding regarding the subject 
matter of which was reviewed at such meeting.  
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Appendix B — Term Sheet for a Banker Misconduct Database 
 The proposal will create a searchable database to collect and 
share information among banks about banker misconduct. 
 The database will be administered by the public sector and paid 
for by large financial institutions (greater than fifty billion 
dollars in total consolidated assets). 
 A new federal statute will create two legal obligations: 
o Duty to report misconduct causally linked to departure 
from firm; and 
o Duty to inquire after conditional offer and before work 
commences. 
 A report to the database does not bar future employment; it 
merely provides information that a prospective employer should 
consider. 
 All federally supervised financial institutions and their 
subsidiaries and all Federal Reserve Banks must participate by 
reporting and accessing information. This includes: 
o Bank holding companies; 
o Non-bank financial companies supervised by the Board 
of Governors; 
o Designated financial market utilities; and 
o Combined U.S. operations of a foreign banking 
organization. 
 Roll-out to other financial firms may be considered, either on a 
mandatory or opt-in basis. 
 Triggering event for reporting is cessation of employment—via 
termination, resignation, retirement, or otherwise—for an 
enumerated reason. These reasons might include: 
o Violation of law, regulation, policy, or guidance; 
o The subject of regulatory enforcement action or criminal 
prosecution; 
o Violation of an employer’s code of conduct; or 
o The subject of customer complaint. 
 Reporting institution must provide the former employee’s name, 
date of birth, title, dates of employment, and a narrative 
explanation of reasonable detail to inform a reader of the nature 
of the underlying conduct. 
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 Ongoing duty to update and amend information in a report, 
especially if new facts emerge following an employee’s 
departure. 
 Reporting obligation covers employees engaged in banking 
functions and other professional positions regardless of their 
level of seniority, but does not cover support staff. 
 Database records may expire after some period of time (five or 
six years). 
 The statute would provide a limited safe harbor for employers 
based on their reporting. Records may be expunged or amended, 
but no money damages may be awarded against an employer.135 
 Due process protections for employees include: 
o Mandatory notice to the former employee, including a 
copy of the report; 
o Optional fast-track, low-cost administrative hearing to 
challenge the accuracy of the report; 
o Absolute right to seek injunctive relief from federal 
district court, regardless of whether first seeking 
administrative relief (i.e., no exhaustion requirement); 
o Availability of a temporary hold on report that is 
challenged by a former employee; 
o No limit on former employee’s right to sue for wrongful 
termination or pursue any other employment claim; and 
o Banking supervisors may take enforcement action 
against participating employers for abuse or misuse of 
the system. 
 Confidentiality protections for employees and employers 
include: 
o No public access (important trade-off for safe harbor); 
o A requirement that access to the database be on a need-
to-know basis; 
o Participating firms must adopt confidentiality 
procedures to protect the information submitted to and 
obtained from the database; and 
o Use of database by supervised financial institutions 
subject to prudential supervision. 
 Penalties for non-reporting or misuse of database: 
                                                     
 135. Cf. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(3)(A) (2018). 
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o Enforcement against supervised institutions (mandatory 
participants) available,136 and if codified in the Bank 
Holding Company Act, heightened criminal and civil 
sanctions.137 
o Criminal obstruction statutes138 continue to apply as a 
backstop against intentional misreporting to the 
government. 
 Conflict with non-U.S. law is to be resolved on a case-by-case 
basis, with participating firms obligated to make “all reasonable 
efforts” to comply with statutory duties. 
 
                                                     
 136. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (2018). 
 137. See 12 U.S.C. § 1847(a), (b), (d) (2018). 
 138. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1505, 1517 (2018). 
